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Abstract
Social networks affect in such a fundamental way the dynamics of the population they support that the global, population-
wide behavior that one observes often bears no relation to the individual processes it stems from. Up to now, linking the
global networked dynamics to such individual mechanisms has remained elusive. Here we study the evolution of
cooperation in networked populations and let individuals interact via a 2-person Prisoner’s Dilemma – a characteristic
defection dominant social dilemma of cooperation. We show how homogeneous networks transform a Prisoner’s Dilemma
into a population-wide evolutionary dynamics that promotes the coexistence between cooperators and defectors, while
heterogeneous networks promote their coordination. To this end, we define a dynamic variable that allows us to track the
self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors in networked populations. Using the same variable, we
show how the global dynamics — and effective dilemma — co-evolves with the motifs of cooperators in the population,
the overall emergence of cooperation depending sensitively on this co-evolution.
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Introduction
Dynamical processes involving populations of individuals
constitute paradigmatic examples of complex systems. From
epidemic outbreaks to opinion formation and behavioral dynamics
[1–9], the impact of the underlying web of ties in the overall
behavior of the population is well known. In this context,
Evolutionary Games [10,11] provide one of the most sophisticated
examples of complex dynamics in which the role of the underlying
network topology proves ubiquitous. For instance, when cooper-
ation is modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperation may
emerge (or not) depending on how the population is networked
[12–37].
Up to now, it has been hard to characterize in detail the
global dynamics by which local self-regarding actions lead to a
collective cooperative scenario, relating it to the network topo-
logy. Indeed, most network studies have been focused on the
analysis of the evolutionary outcome of cooperation [14] —
either by means of the numerical analysis of steady states
[12,16,18,19,24,25,29,32,34,35,38–40] or by means of the an-
alytical determination of the conditions for fixation in the
population or by means of the determination of positive inclusive
fitness effects for particular homogeneous network interaction
structures and low intensities of selection [17,20,22] — without
characterizing the self-organization process by which one of the
strategies outcompetes the other. Here we show how networked
individuals, engaging in a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) of cooperation,
give rise to a global, population wide, behavioral dynamics which
deviates strongly from the original PD, depending sensitively on
the underlying network of contacts: Homogeneous networks
promote a coexistence dynamics between cooperators and
defectors — akin to the Chicken or Snowdrift game [11,38,41–
43] — whereas heterogeneous networks, from broad scale to scale-
free [4,44], favor the coordination between them, similar to the
Stag-hunt game [45].
To this end we define a time-dependent variable — that we call
the average gradient of selection (AGoS) — and use it to track the
self-organization of cooperators when co-evolving with defectors
under network reciprocity. Similar to existing analytical approach-
es [43,46], the AGoS is able to provide a measure of the change in
time of the frequency of cooperative traits under selection. The
AGoS can be computed for arbitrary intensity of selection (see
Methods), arbitrary population structure and arbitrary game
parameterization. We further prove that the global games are not
fixed: they change in time, co-evolving with the motifs of
cooperators in the population. The evolutionary outcome of such
a self-organization process will depend sensitively on this co-
evolution, which can be followed using a time-dependent AGoS.
Dynamical Model
Let us consider pairwise interactions between individuals who
can behave either as a Cooperator (C)o rDefector (D). Whenever
cheated by a D,aC receives a payoff S (the sucker’s payoff), while
the D receives T (temptation to defect). Mutual cooperation
provides R (reward) to each player, while mutual defection
provides P (punishment). One obtains the prisoner’s dilemma (PD)
— the most famous metaphor of cooperation — whenever
T.R.P.S. We formalize the dilemma in terms of a single
parameter B (benefit) by defining T=B.1, R=1, S=1-B and
P=0. The results remain quantitatively unaltered if one adopts
the more popular parameterization T=b, R=b–c, S=2c and
P=0.
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stochastic update rule of social learning, where in each time step a
random individual i imitates the strategy of a randomly selected
neighbor j with a probability that increases with the fitness
difference between them [14,24,47–50] (see Methods). In the limit
of well-mixed populations of size N [10,11], the frequency j/N of
Cs will increase (decrease) in time depending on whether the
gradient of selection [51,52] G(j)~Tz(j){T{(j) is positive
(negative), where T+(j) [47] represent the probabilities to increase
and decrease the number of Cs in the population by one. For the
PD, G(j)v0 for all j and, as a result, cooperation will most
probably die out. The same scenario is obtained when NR‘,
where we recover the scenarios described by the famous replicator
dynamics [11,47–50]. The elegance of this result (despite the
doomsday scenario for Cs) is best appreciated when we realize that
the population ends up adopting the Nash-equilibrium of a PD
game interaction between two individuals: everybody defects.
Consequently, there is no difference in the outcome of the game,
from an individual or from a (collective) population wide
perspective, a feature that, as discussed below, will not remain
true in structured populations.
Results
The previous analysis assumes finite yet structureless popula-
tions, a feature which is seldom observed in practice, with strong
implications in many natural phenomena. A homogeneous
network of size N represents the simplest case of a structured
population, where all individuals engage in the same number of
games k with their first neighbors, also imitating their behavior.
Let us consider a homogeneous random network — also called a
regular random graph — in which all links are randomly
connected, while all nodes have each the same number of links
[4,53,54]. In this case, individuals with the same strategy no longer
share the same fitness: fitness becomes context-dependent. The same
happens to G(j), becoming hard to define it analytically.
Consequently, we define the AGoS — denoting it by GA(j) —
as the average i) over all possible transitions taking place in every
node of the network throughout evolution, and ii) over a large number
of networked evolutions (see Methods). This AGoS, which must be
computed numerically, becomes therefore network dependent but
context independent, as it recovers its population averaged, or
mean-field, character. Hence, the AGoS may constitute a
powerful tool to understand dynamical processes at a popula-
tion-wide scale stemming from individually defined, but often
seemingly unrelated, rules.
The results for GA(j) on homogeneous networks of size N=10
3,
k=4 and different values of B are shown in Fig. 1a. Unlike well-
mixed populations where cooperation has no chance, homoge-
neous networks can sustain cooperation [12,14,15,24,54]. The
shape of GA(j) no longer pictures a defection dominance dilemma
typical of a PD, but a gradient of selection similar to what one
observes under co-existence dilemmas in well-mixed populations
[43]. In other words, even though every individual engages in a
PD, from a global, population-wide perspective, homogeneous
networks are able to create an emerging collective dynamics
promoting the co-existence between Cs and Ds. As we show
below, the emergence of an unanticipated global (macroscopic)
dynamics from a distinct individual (microscopic) dynamics
pervades throughout all evolutionary dynamical processes in
structured populations studied here. The co-existence point xR
(see Fig. 1a) is associated with the internal root (xR[ 0,1    )o f
GA(j)— inexistent in well-mixed populations — whose location
decreases with increasing B. Together with xR one obtains a
coordination root (xL&0, see Fig. 1a) of GA(j) since, in the
absence of cooperative partners, Cs will always be disadvanta-
geous. However, the impact of xL is minor, as shown in Fig. 1b
(see discussion below). Remarkably, this characterization remains
valid for other types of homogeneous networks, such as lattices and
regular rings (as well as for other possible mechanisms of strategy
update) whereas differences in the positions of the stable root (xR)
in of GA(j) and their dependence on B correlate perfectly with
results obtained previously [14,18,24,54–58], where steady-states
of evolution were analyzed for such structures (see Text S1).
Fig. 1a shows that, as we change focus from an individual to a
population wide perspective, one witnesses the emergence of an
effective game transformation, as evidenced by GA(j), which
brings along important consequences: For instance, the fixation
time — the time required for cooperators to invade the entire
population —becomes much larger in homogeneous networks
when compared to well-mixed populations, as the population
spends a large period of time in the vicinity of the xR, mainly when
selection is strong (see Methods). This, in turn, is responsible for
computer simulations to spend arbitrary amounts of time in the
same configuration, even when, in the absence of mutations (as is
the case here), the only absorbing states are associated with
monomorphic configurations of the population, that is, with
configurations comprising cooperators-only or defectors-only. The
Figure 1. Time-independent AGoS. (a) We plot G
A(j) for a
population of players interacting via a PD in a homogeneous random
network, for two values of the benefit B. Globally, G
A(j) indicates that
the population evolves towards a co-existence scenario. (b) Stationary
distributions showing the pervasiveness of each fraction j/N in time. In
line with the AGoS in a), the population spends most of the time in the
vicinity of the stable-like root xR of G
A(j). When j/N<0, Cs become
disadvantageous, giving rise to an unstable-like root xL of G
A(j) which,
however, plays a minor role as shown (N=10
3, ,k.=4 and b=1.0).
Homogeneous random networks were obtained by repeatedly swap-
ping the ends of pairs of randomly chosen links of a regular lattice [54].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032114.g001
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of each fraction of Cs in time, confirms the scenario portrayed by
GA(j) in Fig. 1a, stressing the similarities with the evolutionary
dynamics in (finite) well-mixed populations under co-existence
dilemmas [50,59,60], and putting in evidence the marked
difference between individual preferences and the population-
wide dynamics.
In Fig. 1, our analysis was limited to GA(j) that is, we averaged
over the entire time span of all runs. However, the AGoS itself
evolves in time — GA(j,t)— as detailed in Methods. Let us explore
this time dependence of the AGoS. If, at the beginning of each
simulated evolution, Cs and Ds are randomly spread in the
network, the occurrence of clusters of the same strategy will not
occur in general. Hence, for the PD we have that GA(j,t~0)v0
in general. As populations evolve, Cs( Ds) breed Cs( Ds) in their
neighborhood, promoting the assortment of strategies, with
implications both on the fitness of each player and on the shape
(and sign) of GA(j,t). In Fig. 2a we plot GA(j,t) for three particular
generations, whereas Fig. 2b portrays the time evolution of the
internal roots of GA(j,t), on which we superimposed two
evolutionary runs starting with 50% of Cs randomly placed in
the population. As GA(j,t~0)v0, the fraction of cooperators will
start decreasing (Fig. 2a). However, with time, strategy assortment
leads to the emergence of a co-existence root, toward which the
fraction cooperators converges. The ensuing coexistence between
Cs and Ds, entirely described by the shape of GA(j,t), steams from
the self-organization of Cs and Ds in the network, defining a global
dynamics which is impossible to foresee solely from the nature of
the local (PD) interactions.
It is now generally accepted, however, that homogeneous
networks provide a simplified picture of real interaction networks
[5,44,61,62]. Most social structures share a marked heterogeneity,
where a few nodes exhibit a large number of connections, whereas
most nodes comprise just a few. The fingerprint of this
heterogeneity is provided by the associated degree distributions,
which exhibit a broad-scale shape, often resembling a power-law
[4,44,61]. In the following we use GA(j,t) to understand how
heterogeneity shifts the internal roots in Fig. 1 to the right, thereby
transforming a co-existence scenario into a coordination one. To
this end, we compute GA(j,t) employing scale-free (SF) networks
of Baraba ´si and Albert (BA) (see Methods) [61].
Fig. 3a shows GA(j) for BA networks of N=10
3 nodes and an
average degree k=4, whereas the circles in Fig. 3b portray the
time evolution of the internal roots of GA(j,t). Heterogeneous
networks lead to a global dynamics dominated by a coordination
threshold, originating the appearance of two basins of attraction
split by an unstable root xL of GA(j,t), analogous to the
evolutionary dynamics under 2-person and N-person Stag-hunt
dilemmas in unstructured populations [45,51,63,64]. This unsta-
ble root represents the critical fraction of Cs above which they are
able to assort, thereby invading highly connected nodes, rendering
cooperation an advantageous strategy, as Cs acquire a higher
probability of being imitated than Ds. On SF networks the
requirement to reach the hubs, which ensures the formation of
cooperative star-like clusters [39,52], makes invasion harder for
isolated Cs. This moves the unstable root located close to j/N<0 in
homogeneous networks (see Fig. 1) to higher fractions of Cs. Yet,
once this coordination is overcome, Cs benefit from the strong
influence of hubs to rapidly spread in the population, eventually
leading to fixation. As a result, the stable internal root which
characterizes GA(j) in homogeneous networks collapses into the
vicinity of j=N on heterogeneous structures, promoting the
evolution towards fully cooperative populations. Naturally, the
location of the unstable root of GA(j) is an increasing function of B
(see Fig. 3a). It is noteworthy that our results remain qualitatively
valid for other update rules, such as the discrete analogue of the
replicator dynamics on graphs, used in many references, e.g.,
[16,27,38,65]. In fact, the AGoS is capable of identifying
particular features of such dynamics: For instance, the partially
deterministic nature of such update rule may lead to evolutionary
deadlocks in heterogeneous (scale-free) networks, creating station-
ary states close to full cooperation [16,27]. In such situation, the
AGoS will reflect the occurrence of these stationary configurations
by shifting to the left-hand side the stable (xR) equilibrium, which
may no longer coincide with j=N, remaining, however, in its
vicinity.
The existence of a coordination barrier for Cs in heterogeneous
networks, which must first occupy the hubs before outcompeting
Ds, leads to an intricate interplay between the time-dependent
decline of xL (see Fig. 3b) and the global fraction of Cs. In Fig. 3b
we show, with full lines, two evolutions in BA networks (for the
same value of B=1.25): One, which fixates in full cooperation and
another, which fixates in full defection. Whenever the fraction of
cooperators j/N remains sizeable for long enough, xL will
eventually decrease to values satisfying j/N.xL, such that the
global coordination barrier is overcome and the population will
fixate into full cooperation (light blue line). Otherwise, j/N may
Figure 2. Time-dependent AGoS. (a) We plot G
A(j,t) for three
different instants of evolutionary time. Each line provides a snapshot for
a given moment, portraying the emergence of a population-wide (time-
dependent) co-existence-like dilemma stemming from an individual
(time-independent) defection dominant dilemma (PD). (b) The circles
show the position of the different interior roots of G
A(j,t), whereas the
solid (dark blue) line and (light blue) crosses show two independent
evolutionary runs starting from 50% of Cs and Ds randomly placed in
the networked population. Open (full) circles stand for unstable, xL




Global Dilemmas in Social Networks
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e32114remain always below xL with the population fixating into full
defection (dark blue line). Clearly, heterogeneous networks lead to
the emergence of a global coordination barrier and associated
basins of attraction that evolve in time, in a way which is well
described by the time-dependent AGoS.
Discussion
To establish the link between individual and collective behavior
constitutes, undeniably, one of the main goals of the analysis of any
complex multi-particle or multi-component system [66]. Here we
establish such a link showing how it depends on the underlying
network topology. Our study shows that behavioral dynamics of
individuals facing a cooperation dilemma in social networks can be
understood as though the network structure is absent but
individuals face a different dilemma: The structural organization
of a population of self-regarding individuals helps circumventing
the Nash equilibrium of a cooperation dilemma by creating a new
dynamical system that can be globally characterized by two
internal fixed points, xL (unstable) and xR (stable). While a single
defector will be always advantageous (creating an unstable fixed
point at x=1.0), a single cooperator will be always disadvanta-
geous (prompting a stable equilibrium at x=0.0). As cooperators
assort into stable clusters, they may also become advantageous
above a certain critical fraction of cooperators (k/N.xL, associated
with a critical cluster size) and below another critical fraction of
cooperators xR, above which defectors will be able to ripe again the
benefits of exploiting the many surrounding cooperators. Whereas
in homogeneous networks the stable equilibria dictate the overall
dynamics — as in co-existence dilemmas — heterogeneous
networks create a global dynamics mainly dominated by the
unstable equilibria, creating a coordination problem.
Strictly speaking, such a dynamical system resulting from
individuals interacting (locally) via a two-person game, cannot be
mapped onto a two-person evolutionary game in a well-mixed
population, since the latter can only comply with a maximum of
one internal fixed point [43]. On the contrary, such dynamics
resembles that from, e.g., N-person dilemmas [67,68] in the
presence of coordination thresholds [51,64,69]. It is as if the global
dynamics of a 2-person dilemma in structured populations can be
properly described as a time-dependent N-person dilemma, in
which the coordination or co-existence features emerge from the
population structure itself, with different network topologies
emphasizing differently this co-existence/coordination dichotomy.
It is worth emphasizing that the approach developed here in the
context of the two-person PD may be useful _ and immediately
applicable _ in understanding the evolutionary dynamics of other
game interactions, as well as in understanding other aspects of
human sociality that extend beyond cooperation. From human
behaviors and ideas, to diseases spreading or to individual
preferences, most have been modeled as a person-to-person
spreading process embedded in a social network [5,8,62]. In such
frameworks, the identification and categorization of the global,
population-wide dynamics which emerges from the apparently
unrelated nature of the local interactions may enable one to
anticipate the emergent outcomes of such complex biological and
social systems.
Methods
Evolution is modelled via a stochastic birth-death process
[47,70,71]. Each individual x adopts the strategy of a randomly
selected neighbour y with probability given by the Fermi function
p: 1ze{b(fy{fx)    {1 [14,47], where fx (fy) stands for the
accumulate payoff of x (y) and b controls the intensity of selection.
In structured populations, the difference of the probabilities to
increase and decrease the number of Cs( G(j)~Tz(j){T{(j))
becomes context dependent, but can be computed numerically.
For each individual i we compute the probability of changing
behavior at time t, Ti(t)~ 1
ki
P  n ni
m~1
1ze{b fm(t){fi(t) ðÞ    {1
, where ki
stands for the degree of node i and  n ni for the number of neighbors
of i having a strategy different from that of i. The time-dependent
AGoS at a given time t of simulation p, where we have j Cs in the









i~1 Ti(t). For a given network type, we run
V=2 610
7 simulations (using 10
3 randomly generated networks)
starting from all possible initial fractions j/N of cooperators.
Each configuration of the population is defined here by the
fraction j/N of cooperators. Evolutions run for L=10
5 time






p~1 Gp(j,t) over all simulations and
time-steps. The time-dependent gradients GA(j,t0) for a particular
generation t0 (and corresponding roots shown in Fig. 2 and
3b) were computed averaging over the configurations occurr-
Figure 3. AGoS on BA networks. (a) Starting from a defection
dominant PD played at an individual level, a coordination dynamics
emerges at a global, population-wide scale, for the three values of B
depicted. (b) Evolution of the unstable root xL of G
A(j,t) (open circles),
exhibiting the time-dependence of the global dynamics; solid (dark
blue) line and (light blue) crosses show two independent evolutionary
runs starting from 50% of Cs and Ds randomly placed. The ultimate fate
of Cs in each run depends on whether the population composition
crosses over the time-dependent value xL of G
A(j,t) thereby overcoming
the dynamical coordination barrier during evolution. (B=1.25, N=10
3,
,k.=4 and b=0.1). BA networks were obtained combining growth
and preferential attachment, following the model proposed by Baraba ´si
and Albert [61].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0032114.g003
Global Dilemmas in Social Networks






p~1 Gp(j,t). The stationary distributions
pictured in Fig. 1b were obtained computing the fraction of time
the population spent in each overall configuration j/N. In some
specific limits — in particular, for weak selection or well-mixed
populations — our numerical approach will provide results
analogous to those obtained with other methods (see for instance
[20,22,43,46,47,50,60,71–74]).
Homogeneous random networks were obtained by repeatedly
swapping the ends of pairs of randomly chosen links of a regular
network [54]. BA networks were obtained combining growth and
preferential attachment, following the model proposed by Baraba ´si
and Albert [4,61]. All networks used have N=10
3 nodes and an
average degree k=4.
Supporting Information
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